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BOOK REVIEWS
Equity Jurisprudence. (2 Vols.) By Fred F. Lawrence. Mathew
Bender & Company, Albany, New York. 1929.
This work purports to be a treatise upon the entire field of equity. The
point of view of the author is the traditional one-namely that equity is in
itself a distinct and unified branch of jurisprudence. The method which the
author has employed in the treatment of his subject is likewise the traditional one. Notwithstanding, he conceives of himself as a pioneer in this field.
His notion is that equity has been treated too much as the sum of the jurisdictional factors of the Chancery courts, the growth of which has been outlined largely by the shortcomings of the common law. He insists that
equity has been "viewed too much in the light of a historical accident, a
congeries or catalogue of maxims and standards of conduct for tribunals of
a certain type." His thesis is that "equity is far more than a heritage of
the past" and that "law schools should accord to it the position of dignity
in the science of jurisprudence to which it is fairly entitled." After the
announcement of these views in his preface, the author proceeds to develop
and expound his subject in the same manner that has been employed by
the majority of scholars in his field in the past.
It seems worth suggesting that the point of view of which the author
complains is the viewpoint of departure for modern thinkers in this field.
It seems to be gaining ground that "equity" had been treated too much as
a unified branch of jurisprudence and that instead of attempting to regard
it as a separate and independent "system" of law it should be treated together with the materials of the common law pertaining to the various
subjects involved.
So far as a critical appraisal of the author's work is concerned there is
not a great deal to be said. This reviewer makes no pretense whatever to
having examined closely the entire contents of these two substantial volumes. Certain sections have been read rather carefully and the entire
work has been scanned in a cursory manner. Two or three thoughts will be
passed on for what they are worth. It seems that the author has made
no serious attempt to treat any part of his subject matter exhaustively.
The work is clearly of an elementary nature. The dogmas of the subject
are presented, frequently in the language and formulae of the courts. Most
of the citations are to modern American cases and annotations. By reason
of the elementary nature of the treatment many of the chapters appear to
be somewhat inadequate. This no doubt is a necessary defect due to the
point of view which the author expounds. One could hardly expect a
complete or adequate treatment of the law of fraudulent conveyances, for
example, in a work of this kind. The historical background of this phase
of the law is almost entirely omitted. Many of its most difficult problems
are treated in a superficial manner as for instance the position of prior
and subsequent creditors of the grantor. This matter is disposed of in
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one short paragraph of six sentences. Another illustration of the same
inadequacy is the chapter on judgments consisting of twenty-two pages of
text. Res Judicata commands one paragraph of one sentence.
The author reveals himself a man of rather wide learning in his subject. He is familiar with a good portion of the learned literature on
equity. Although there is a marked paucity of citations to this literature,
there are occasional references to the writings of Ames, Maitland, Pomroy,
Cook, and others.
In the estimation of this reviewer this work is not nearly so valuable
as Clark's small handbook nor can it be compared with Pomroy's extensive
work on the subject. On the other hand it is by no means a futile effort.
The author's obvious purpose was to present to the practicing profession
what he believes to be a practical and accurate statement of what "equity"
is. This purpose is perhaps attained in a reasonably satisfactory way. The
work would no doubt be valuable in most law offices for handy and quick
reference. It has a complete table of contents, a very usable index and 130
pages devoted to a table of cases.
FowLER VINCENT HARPER,

Indiana University Law School.

Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading. By Charles E. Clark.
West Publishing Company, 1928.
That this is the most valuable text on the subject of Code Pleading is
obvious. The book deserves higher praise than that, in fact, because previous efforts along the same line have been quite perfunctory. Dean Clark
has made a distinct contribution on the subject, and at the same time has
produced a most usable book. Although the book is small in its proportions, it covers the ground thoroughly, and Indiana Lawyers will find a
large number of Indiana cases cited. It is the reviewer's opinion, based
both on experience with use of the book in practice and teaching, that a
lawyer in a Code state who is actively engaged in the trial of cases can
not afford to be without its assistance. There is an informed, mature, intelligent and scholarly discussion of the principles of Code Pleading, and the
cases decided under the Code. That is altogether too rare an attribute of
most legal textbooks. Too often the legal text book is just another digest
in disguise.
The reviewer is far from convinced that all of Dean Clark's theories are
sound and workable. Primarily it is doubted if his definition of the Code
"cause of action" can be sustained as a proper interpretation of the Code.
certainly however it is an arguable point, and it will be found that the argument is stimulating, and has not influenced the discussion and statements
as to what the cases decide. It is recommended most highly to the bench
and bar of the state.
BERNARD C. GAVIT,
Indiana University School of Law.

